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Abstract
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Mexico has increased dramatically since the inception
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), raising questions about its eﬀect on
the Mexican economy. This paper studies the impact of FDI on industry productivity and
wages over the first ten years of NAFTA, paying particular attention to the source country
and destination industry of investments. It also oﬀers a detailed description of the evolution
of FDI, its components, sectoral composition, and sources from 1994-2005. There is evidence
of a positive eﬀect of FDI on productivity, particularly total factor productivity (TFP). The
eﬀect on wages is negative or zero at best, suggesting a divergence from productivity over this
time period. The positive productivity eﬀect stems largely from U.S. FDI into non-maquiladora
industries, which receive over two thirds of manufacturing FDI. There is no evidence that more
distant source countries have a diﬀerential eﬀect. Consistent with theoretical expectations, FDI
into maquiladoras benefits unskilled workers at the expense of skilled workers. This eﬀect may
be strong enough to dampen income inequality.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have increased more than either world trade
or world production. For many developing countries, FDI has become an important, if not the most
important source of external financing (UNCTAD, 2006). Driving at least some of this increase has
been a widespread change in policies as countries have turned away from inward looking import
substitution to embracing trade and foreign investment. FDI in particular is considered beneficial
not only because it brings in much needed capital, but generates employment and presumably con-
tributes to enhanced economic growth as it provides access to advanced technologies and spillovers,
technological or otherwise (Borensztein et al., 1998; De Mello, 1999).
Despite the increased relative importance of FDI, only a few countries have been recipients of
substantial absolute flows, among them China, Brazil, and Mexico. The latter has actively been
trying to attract FDI since the 1980s, first by relaxing restrictions on foreign investment.1 However,
these unilateral policies were not seen as suﬃcient as they were lacking a commitment eﬀect.
Thus, soon thereafter, Mexico pursued the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) whose
expressly stated objective was to attract more FDI (Tornell and Esquivel, 1997). There is compelling
evidence that the agreement has assured investors of Mexico’s lasting commitment to reform and
resulted in substantially and permanently higher FDI inflows, as documented, for example, in
Waldkirch (2003) and Cuevas et al. (2005). Moreover, NAFTA has facilitated the evolution of a
vertically integrated production network in North America, further changing the composition of
FDI from predominantly market seeking to exploiting Mexico’s comparative advantage. The rise in
and changing nature of FDI raise questions about its eﬀect on important economic outcomes such
as productivity and income.
This paper examines the eﬀect of FDI flows on total factor productivity (TFP), labor produc-
tivity, and wages in the post-NAFTA period. It pays particular attention to potential diﬀerential
eﬀects stemming from the source of the investment, its type and destination industry, which is
rarely done in the literature. As, for example, Griﬃths and Sapsford (2004) have pointed out,
FDI from countries that are closer to the world technology frontier should have a greater positive
impact than FDI from technologically less advanced countries, provided the host country’s absorp-
tive capacity is suﬃciently high. Physical distance to investors’ home countries may also matter.
1There was a major overhaul of Mexico’s investment laws in 1989. Many obstacles to foreign investors, such
as licensing requirements and restrictions pertaining to majority ownership, were removed. This change reversed
Mexico’s long-standing policy of reserving ownership in many sectors to Mexican nationals or the Mexican state and
encouraging foreign investment only in sectors that were deemed crucial to the pursuit of import substitution policies.
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Firms from countries that are close by will have lower costs sourcing from their home countries
than firms from more distant ones, who are more likely to source locally, thereby increasing the
likelihood of spillovers (Javorcik et al., 2004; Rodríguez-Clare, 1996). FDI flowing into (unskilled)
labor intensive industries may provide less technology and thus have little or no positive eﬀect on
industry productivity. In particular, FDI in the maquiladora industry is a candidate for investment
that may not meet expectations with respect to productivity or wages, although by raising the
relative demand for unskilled workers, it may help reduce income inequality.2 Given the detailed
nature of the available FDI data, we can examine all of these hypotheses.
I emphasize that I make no attempt to assess the eﬀect of NAFTA on Mexico. Given numerous
other factors aﬀecting the Mexican economy since 1994, such as the peso crisis, the East Asian
crisis, the U.S. recession and political unrest to name but a few, it is hard, if not impossible, to
disentangle the eﬀects of the agreement. The goal of the paper is more modest in assessing the
eﬀect that FDI over this time period has had, although given that the case for NAFTA raising FDI
inflows has been well established (see the earlier citations), there is certainly a presumption that
the eﬀects we find can at least in part be traced back to the agreement.
Mexico is not only an interesting case study due to its proximity to the United States and the
controversy surrounding the eﬀects NAFTA has had on it. It is also relevant for other (advanced)
developing countries seeking or having recently concluded trade agreements with developed coun-
tries, such as Eastern European countries that have recently joined the European Union, Turkey,
or Latin American countries in negotiations over trade agreements with the United States or Asian
countries seeking closer economic integration with Japan.
Thus far, there is very little evidence on the eﬀect of the sharply increased foreign participation
in the Mexican economy in the wake of NAFTA. Ramirez (2006) examines the eﬀect of FDI on labor
productivity in Mexico from 1960-2001, thus mixing pre- and post-NAFTA years. Moreover, his
analysis is at the country level and thus unable to discern diﬀerential eﬀects at the industry level.
López-Córdova (2003) uses firm-level data from annual surveys to examine FDI spillovers between
1993 and 2000. While his analysis is informative, the use of a non-representative sample does not
provide a full account of the impact on the Mexican economy. The present study, in contrast, uses
Industrial Census data, albeit at the industry level, which covers all firms. It also covers more
2Maquiladoras are in-bond assembly plants, largely located across Mexico’s border with the United States. The
maquiladora program has provided for reduced duties for Mexican exports into the U.S. since the 1960s. Upon
re-importation, Section 9802 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule stipulates that only the value-added part of the
imported good is subject to duties.
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post-NAFTA years than any prior study that I am aware of, including the early 2000s when some
commentators pointed out increasing problems in the Mexican economy (see, e.g., Cuevas et al.,
2005).
The FDI data used is very detailed. I have annual data for 4-digit (Mexican Classification
System, known by its Spanish acronym CMAP) manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, for
a total of 128, distinguished by country of origin of the flow, for the years 1994-2005. Moreover,
the data separate maquiladora FDI from other manufacturing FDI. While the regression analysis
is confined to the manufacturing sector, a secondary contribution of this paper is to document the
details of FDI into Mexico since NAFTA for all sectors. This descriptive evidence confirms some
commonly held perceptions, such as the United States being by far the most important source of
FDI, while dispelling others. For example, about half of FDI is into the services sector, mining
receives a negligible amount of foreign investment, and only about 30 percent of manufacturing
FDI is in maquiladoras.
The results are mixed from a welfare perspective. On the one hand, productivity, particularly
total factor productivity, appears to be positively aﬀected by FDI, specifically U.S. FDI into non-
maquiladora industries. On the other hand, the eﬀect on average compensation per worker is
negative or zero at best, depending on the specification, even after controlling for many other
determinants of compensation such as capital intensity, scale economies, the composition of the
work force and unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level. Together, these findings suggest
that the owners of capital benefit from productivity improvements rather than labor. There is also
some evidence that maquiladora FDI may indeed help dampen income inequality by raising the
relative demand for and thus the wages of unskilled workers.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a detailed description of the evolution
of FDI in Mexico from 1994-2005, followed by a more extensive literature review. I then discuss some
pertinent theoretical considerations before laying out the empirical methodology, which is based
on a simple theoretical model and includes a thorough discussion of TFP measurement. After
providing some evidence on the changing nature of FDI in the wake of NAFTA, the regression
results are analyzed. The final section concludes.
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2 FDI in Mexico Since NAFTA
This section provides a detailed description of the magnitude, sources and destination industries of
FDI in Mexico in the post-NAFTA period. Between 1994 and 2005, FDI flows into Mexico total
about $170 billion, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.3 The bulk of foreign investment goes into
the manufacturing and services sectors, about the same amount over this time period. About 30
percent of manufacturing FDI is in maquiladoras, a share that is fairly constant. This is remarkable
for two reasons. First, the main advantage of maquiladoras, that tariﬀs apply only to the value
added in Mexico, should be eroding as tariﬀs fall to zero due to NAFTA. Thus, one would expect a
declining share of maquiladora investment. Second, the large share of non-maquiladora investment
shows that manufacturing operations by foreign multinationals in Mexico do not just consist of the
assembly of final goods destined for export to the United States or elsewhere.4 Within services,
over 20 percent are in wholesale and retail trade, where flows do not fluctuate much. Most of the
fluctuation in the services sector is due to large acquisitions in banking. Finally, agriculture and
mining receive negligible amounts of foreign investment.
The United States has historically been and remains the most important source of FDI, as
can be seen in Table 2. Over the whole sample period, over 60 percent of FDI originates there.
Other important source countries are predominantly developed, as evidenced by the OECD share
of over 95 percent. The European Union, chiefly the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and France,
account for about 25 percent of all flows. Developing countries are negligible as sources of FDI.5
Table 3 breaks the manufacturing sector down into eight subsectors and provides more detail
on services subsectors as well. Nearly half of manufacturing FDI has gone into metals, electrical
machinery and automobiles, with the latter accounting for a little over one third of that. Significant
investments have also been made in food processing and the chemical industry. Over 40 percent
of services FDI is in banking and insurance, reflecting several large scale investments in Mexican
banks, most following troubles in the late 1990s which led to a relaxation of foreign ownership
rules in that sector, now allowing for majority foreign ownership. The table also shows the share
of selected source countries for these subsectors. While the United States accounts for the largest
share of FDI in many sectors, other countries are important in some. This includes Canada, the
other NAFTA partner, in publishing and clay, glass and cement; the UK in food and tobacco;
3The data are from the Secretaría de Economía, which reports them in U.S. dollars.
4While maquiladoras are no longer required to export all of their output, in practice, most still do.
5 In fact, most of that flow consists of the acquisition of the steel company Siderurgica del Balsas by Mittal Steel
from India in 1994.
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Spain in communications, banking and insurance and other non-traded services sectors; and Japan
in automobiles.
3 Related Literature
There is a considerable literature studying productivity eﬀects from foreign investment in Mexico,
although there is a paucity of recent, post-NAFTA work. Two early studies that find positive
spillover eﬀects of multinationals in a cross-section of industries in Mexico are Blomström (1986)
and Blomström andWolﬀ (1994), both of which use data from 1970 and 1975. Jordaan (2005), using
data from the 1994 Industrial Census, finds that positive externalities from the presence of foreign
firms hinge on the size of technological diﬀerences between them and domestic firms. However, as
Görg and Greenaway (2004) and others have emphasized, finding evidence of productivity eﬀects
in a cross-section is not convincing due to a clear endogeneity problem. It is likely that foreign
firms are attracted to more productive industries or will acquire more productive firms in the first
place and thus the observed correlation between the degree of foreign ownership and productivity
is a spurious one. Only with more years of data can this self-selection eﬀect be controlled for.
More recently, Ramirez (2006) examines the eﬀect of FDI on labor productivity growth in Mex-
ico over the period 1960-2001, using economy-wide aggregate data. While the focus is not on the
post-NAFTA period, some years are included. He finds a positive eﬀect of foreign investment per
worker, which, however, is diminishing over the time period studied. There are two recent studies
that use Mexican plant-level data. López-Córdova (2003) is closest to this paper in that he ex-
plores NAFTA and manufacturing productivity, finding positive inter-, but negative intra-industry
spillovers. He, as well as Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare (2004), who explore inter-industry linkages
more thoroughly, use data that come from the annual industrial survey, which oversamples large
plants and is not a representative sample. Moreover, the data extend only until 2000. Another
study that uses the annual survey in documenting the evolution of total factor and labor productiv-
ity in Mexico from 1994-2002 is Montes-Rojas and Santamaria (2007). While they find a positive
eﬀect of international trade, they do not examine the eﬀect of FDI.
In a seminal study of Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that positive productivity
eﬀects are confined to plants with foreign equity participation, and then only small ones, but that
domestic plants are negatively aﬀected, with a very small overall positive eﬀect. In a large panel
study of over 30 OECD and non-OECD countries De Mello (1999) finds that FDI has a positive
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eﬀect on TFP growth in OECD countries, but no or even a negative eﬀect in non-OECD ones. He
also finds that the eﬀect of FDI on capital accumulation is nonexistent or negative in the former,
but positive in the latter. Put together, these findings lead him to conclude that in technologically
laggard countries, there exists a complementarity eﬀect between FDI and domestic investment,
resulting in a reduction in TFP growth as FDI enters. For technological leaders, on the other
hand, there is a substitution eﬀect, perhaps because older capital is made obsolete more quickly
and comprehensively by the introduction of new capital via FDI.
In their extensive survey of the literature, Görg and Greenaway (2004) find that the evidence on
productivity and spillovers is mixed and depends largely on the study methodology and data used.
While they point out that ideally, a panel of firms observed over a number of years should be used
to elicit productivity eﬀects of foreign investment, they emphasize that it is particularly crucial to
have more than a cross-section in order to be able to deal with self-selection bias and unobserved
heterogeneity. In addition, Görg and Strobl’s (2001) meta-analysis points out that there appears
to be some publication bias, which suggests that the evidence is even more mixed than a review of
published studies suggests.
As far as wages are concerned, Aitken et al. (1996), in a study of Venezuela, Mexico and the
United States, find that foreign presence has a positive overall eﬀect on wages in Mexico, both
skilled and unskilled, with a larger eﬀect on the former, suggesting that FDI might be inequality-
enhancing. Similarly, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) document the inequality increasing eﬀect of
foreign investment. Their explanation is that operations that are outsourced from the United
States tend to be unskilled labor-intensive from the outsourcing country’s point of view, but tend
to be skilled labor-intensive from the recipient country’s point of view, due to diﬀerences in the
range of goods produced. While the finding that multinationals pay higher wages in developing
countries is fairly robust (see the summary of evidence in Lim (2001), pp. 39-41), Lipsey (2002),
in his comprehensive review of FDI eﬀects, concludes that the evidence on overall wage eﬀects is
relatively scarce. If anything, existing studies seem to find a slightly positive eﬀect that is stronger
for white collar than for blue collar workers.
There are several studies of income inequality in Mexico that look at the eﬀect of trade liberal-
ization without explicit consideration of the coincident rise in FDI. Examples include Hanson and
Harrison (1999), Feliciano (2001) and Esquivel and Rodríguez-López (2003). Hanson and Harrison
(1999) study the period 1984-90 and find that the rise in wage inequality could be due to low-skill
intensive sectors disproportionately being aﬀected by trade liberalization and consequently more
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competition from economies with large reserves of unskilled labor. Feliciano (2001) finds that trade
liberalization has contributed to rising wage inequality in Mexico, but finds no eﬀect on employ-
ment. Esquivel and Rodríguez-López (2003) include a comparison of the period before NAFTA
(1988-1994) and the first six years of NAFTA (1994-2000) and find that trade liberalization would
have led to a reduction in the wage gap; however, its eﬀect was oﬀset by a large negative impact of
technological progress on the real wage of unskilled workers for the first six year period. During the
first six years of NAFTA, the eﬀect of trade liberalization is found to be zero. Hanson (2003, 2007),
using data from the 1990 and 2000 Population Censuses, finds little evidence of wage convergence
between the United States and Mexico, but a continued rise in returns to skill throughout the
1990s, some of which he attributes to “globalization”, including FDI. Finally, Taylor and Driﬃeld
(2005) look at the eﬀect of FDI on wage inequality in the UK and find that after controlling for
technology and trade, FDI explains on average 11 percent of wage inequality.
4 Theoretical Considerations
The entry of foreign firms into a market aﬀects productivity and wages for several reasons. Since
foreign owners are inherently disadvantaged relative to domestically owned firms with superior
knowledge of local markets and practices, they must possess firm-specific advantages in the form
of proprietary assets, technology or management and marketing practices (what Markusen (2002)
terms ‘knowledge capital’). These imply higher productivity of foreign-owned firms themselves.
Moreover, there may be benefits to local firms stemming from productivity spillovers. Productivity
spillovers generally take place when the entry or presence of multinational firms leads to eﬃciency
or productivity benefits for local firms that are not fully internalized by the foreign firm (Blomström
and Kokko, 1998). For example, host country workers that they hire and train may leave and join
or set up local firms. Marketing practices may be observed and imitated. Multinationals have an
interest in containing spillovers since these tend to reduce their advantage and thus their profits,
but are not entirely able to do so.
The entry of multinational firms into a market may also aﬀect productivity by disturbing
the existing market equilibrium. Entry may erode the market power of existing indigenous firms,
reducing measured productivity, which reflects market power as well as technical eﬃciency (Bernard
et al., 2003). Thus, the eﬀect of foreign entry on domestic firms’ productivity is ambiguous. The
overall impact on an industry is determined by the combination of foreign superiority, spillovers
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and competition eﬀects.
A number of FDI characteristics are indicators of the possible scope of foreign productivity
advantages and spillovers, but this discussion focuses on those that can be addressed in the empirical
work. They include the source country of investment and the destination industry. Labor-intensive,
low-technology industries such as the maquiladoras may receive investment in order to exploit labor
cost advantages, but rely on well-known technologies and require little skill, limiting the scope of
spillovers. Put diﬀerently, vertical FDI is less likely to generate positive productivity eﬀects than
horizontal investment.6
Investment from countries close to or at the world technology frontier, such as the United States,
is more likely to provide previously unavailable assets than investment from countries at a similar
distance to the frontier (Griﬃths and Sapsford, 2004). But even among advanced countries, there
are likely to be diﬀerences. Firms from countries that are close by will have lower costs sourcing
from their home countries than firms from more distant ones, who are more likely to source locally
(Javorcik et al., 2004; Rodríguez-Clare, 1996). Home country sourcing is also higher for firms from
countries with whom the host has concluded preferential trade agreements. In the case of Mexico,
the U.S. is both close by and a partner in a trade agreement.7 Both distance and the existence
of preferential trade in turn aﬀect the likelihood of FDI being of the vertical or of the horizontal
kind. Firms from close-by countries where re-exports face low tariﬀs are more likely to exploit
factor price diﬀerences, thus engaging in vertical FDI, whereas firms from more distant countries
are likely to be market seeking and thus engage in horizontal FDI. However, the opportunity for
firms outside of a free trade agreement to engage in export platform investment, provided rules
of origin are satisfied, may muddle this distinction.8 In summary, U.S. FDI is expected to have
a greater productivity eﬀect than non-U.S. FDI due to its technological superiority, but a lesser
eﬀect due to NAFTA and its proximity. Hence, this must be determined empirically.
To the extent that wages reflect productivity, the eﬀect of FDI on them should be similar to
its eﬀect on productivity. However, skilled and unskilled workers may be aﬀected diﬀerently, for
several reasons. Increasing capital flows, as in the wake of NAFTA, should raise the demand for
skill and thus contribute to rising wage inequality since capital and skill tend to be complementary.
6Although recall Feenstra and Hanson’s (1997) argument that the outsourced activities may appear skilled-labor
intensive from the recipient country’s point of view.
7Subsequent to NAFTA, Mexico has also concluded bilateral free trade agreements with a number of other coun-
tries, most notably the European Union in 1999.
8There are additional reasons why distinguishing source countries is important. For example, Levy Yeyati et al.
(2007) find that U.S. and European outward FDI behave diﬀerently from Japanese outward FDI because the former
move countercyclically while the latter moves procyclically.
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This may not be the case for maquiladora investment, however, if it raises the relative demand for
unskilled workers. More generally, trade liberalization should result in the convergence of goods
and factor prices. This should raise both unskilled and skilled wages, where the Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem predicts that for an unskilled-labor abundant country such as Mexico, the skill premium
should fall as unskilled wages rise relatively more.9 Thus, this again becomes an empirical question.
5 Empirical Methodology
Consider a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
Yit = AitKα1it L
α2
it eit (1)
where Yit is value added, Ait, Kit and Lit denote total factor productivity (TFP), capital and labor
in sector i at time t, respectively, and e is a random disturbance term. Note that I do not impose
constant returns to scale. Taking natural logarithms and re-arranging slightly, we obtain
yit = α1kit + α2lit + ωit + εit (2)
where lower case letters denote log values, ωit = ln (Ait) and εit = ln (eit). TFP is taken to be
influenced by the foreign presence in the sector and other factors to be made precise below. But first
I need to discuss how to estimate ωit in equation (2). The basic problem in estimating (unobserved)
sector- and time-specific productivity is that decision makers may observe it, which conditions their
input choices, but the econometrician does not. If this is the case, there is a simultaneity problem,
which means that the variable inputs and ωit are correlated and thus ordinary least squares (OLS)
would produce inconsistent estimates. There are several solutions which have been proposed. Olley
and Pakes (1996) proxy for ωit by introducing an investment function
invit = ft (ωit, kit) (3)
which, if invit is monotonically increasing in ωit, can be inverted and then substituted into the
production function (2). The problem is that this procedure requires strictly positive investment
and observations that show zero investment must be dropped. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) rely on
9Various explanations have been put forward for factor price changes that are at odds with neoclassical theory,
such as that by Feenstra and Hanson (1997) discussed above. Bernard et al. (2004) contend that an extremely uneven
regional factor distribution in Mexico ("lumpiness") can also prompt production and trade patterns that are contrary
to overall comparative advantage.
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intermediate input usage instead, which is available in the Mexican data. Consider the intermediate
input demand function
mit = gt (ωit, kit) (4)
which, if mit is monotonically increasing in ωit, can be inverted to obtain
ωit = g−1t (mit, kit) . (5)
The only additional assumption needed to proceed with the estimation of productivity is that
it follows a first-order Markov process. Substituting (5) into (2) gives
yit = α1kit + α2lit + g−1t (mit, kit) + εit (6)
which can be written as
yit = α2lit + φt (mit, kit) + εit (7)
where φt (mit, kit) = α1kit + g
−1
t (mit, kit). The function φt can be estimated with a third-order
polynomial approximation in mit and kit, and thus this first stage of the estimation yields the
estimate bα2 of α2.
Since it cannot be identified separately when estimating equation (7), the coeﬃcient on capital,
α1, is obtained in a second estimation stage, which I will sketch briefly. From (7), one computes
an estimated value bφt, which can be used to compute a prediction for ωit for any candidate value
α∗1 using bωit = bφt − α∗1kit. Using these values, a consistent approximation of the expected value of
ωit is given by the predicted values of the regression
bωit = γ0 + γ1ωit−1 + γ2ω2it−1 + γ3ω3it−1 + it. (8)
Then, the estimate bα1 of α1 is found as the solution to minimizing the sample residual of
the production function with respect to α∗1. A bootstrapping procedure is used to construct the
standard errors for bα1 and bα2. For further details, see Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). I implement
this procedure using the ‘levpet’ command in STATA, which was written by Levinsohn, Petrin and
Brian Poi (see also Petrin et al., 2004).
Now, TFP is modeled as a function of foreign presence and other factors that matter according
to theory:
tfpit = β0 + β1FDIit + β2QLit + β3Scaleit + β4Concit + ψit. (9)
where FDI is foreign direct investment, QL the quality of labor, Scale the scale of production,
Conc a measure of industry concentration and ψit an iid error. For notational convenience and
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to distinguish what follows from the procedure of estimating TFP, ωit is replaced by tfpit. Data
is available from three Industrial Census years, 1994, 1999, and 2004 (t) for 52 manufacturing
industries (i) where the data in each case refer to the previous year.10 FDI is measured as annual
flows. Thus, it is natural to aggregate accumulated flows between Census years as a measure of the
change in the degree of foreign presence in a particular industry between Censuses. Consequently,
outcome and control variables would also be measured as changes. However, since FDI flows as
measured are not adjusted for capital depreciation, at least some of these flows will not change the
level of foreign capital. Since there is no other measure of foreign capital, the analysis will use both
levels and changes of all variables other than FDI. If foreign investment has a positive eﬀect on
TFP, β1 will be greater than zero.
The first control variable to take into account is the quality of labor. A higher average la-
bor quality or equivalently skill level is likely to result in higher productivity. This is proxied
by the share of skilled workers in the total labor force of an industry, calculated using workers’
remuneration shares rather than the number of workers. At this point, a brief discussion of the
measures of “skilled” and “unskilled” workers is in order. The Mexican Industrial Census distin-
guishes obreros, who are equivalent to blue-collar or production workers, and empleados, who are
equivalent to white-collar or non-production workers. Hanson and Harrison (1999) further note
that blue-collar worker activities include machine operation, production supervision, repair, main-
tenance, and cleaning. Those of white-collar workers include management, product development,
administration, and general oﬃce tasks. It is common in work on Mexico to identify white-collar
workers as skilled labor and blue-collar workers as unskilled labor (Hanson and Harrison, 1999).
While there are obvious shortcomings with this distinction, no other breakdown is available for
Mexico. There is information on both the number of such workers as well as their respective com-
pensation.11 Thus, in constructing the share of skilled workers either measure can be used, although
the results are not aﬀected by which one is chosen.12
Another important control is the scale of production. Industries that are characterized by
economies of scale are likely to have higher total factor productivity, ceteris paribus. The Census
10Petroleum-related industries, where FDI is severely restricted, are dropped from the analysis, as is the tobacco
sector, which is an obvious outlier.
11 Information on the number of hours worked annually are only available in the 1999 and 2004 Census, not the
1994 one. Hanson and Harrison (1999) show, using annual survey data for 1984-1999, that the correlation between
number of workers and hours worked is extremely high. This is the case for the 1999 and 2004 data as well.
12Leamer (1998) suggests a classification that is based on compensation. It assumes that the industry with the
lowest average wage consists of unskilled workers only, whereas the industry with the highest average wage consists
of skilled workers only. The other industries fall in between. Using this classification also makes very little diﬀerence
to the results.
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provides a limited amount of information, so production scale is proxied by the average output per
plant in a sector. A positive coeﬃcient sign on this variable is expected.
Industries with a higher concentration of firms are expected to have higher productivity due
to the higher markup firms are able to charge. Unfortunately, no concentration measure such as
the Herfindahl Index is available for all three Census years. Thus, we use the number of plants
per sector. Given that we have already controlled for average plant size, this should provide a
reasonable proxy for (the inverse of) industry concentration. Thus, a negative coeﬃcient sign on
this variable is expected.
One well-known problem with using industry-level data is that diﬀerences in productivity across
sectors might be correlated with foreign activity because foreign firms are attracted to sectors that
already have higher productivity. If that is the case, then failing to control for diﬀerences across
industries is likely to find a positive correlation between FDI and industry productivity. A common
solution to this problem is the use of industry fixed eﬀects, which is possible here. These will also
account for unobserved heterogeneity across industries other than initial productivity.
Still, since the time dimension of this panel is very short, and thus the inclusion of fixed eﬀects
reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably, identification of FDI eﬀects may be diﬃcult.
There is another way to control for a possible self-selection eﬀect. The 1994 Census data pertain to
1993, the year just before the inception of NAFTA and the first year of the FDI data. Thus, one can
include an “initial condition”. That is, use productivity in 1998 and 2003 as the dependent variable,
regressed on previously accumulated FDI and the control variables and include 1993 productivity. If
foreign firms are disproportionately attracted to industries that were more productive to begin with,
the 1993 productivity control will account for that. Since this initial condition is only available as
a level control, it will not be employed when TFP and the other variables are measured as changes.
Thus, the three basic models to be estimated are
tfpit = β0 + β1FDIit + β2QLit + β3Scaleit + β4Concit + tfpi,1993 + ψit (10)
tfpit = β0 + β1FDIit + β2QLit + β3Scaleit + β4Concit + μi + ψit (11)
∆tfpit = β0 + β1FDIit + β2∆QLit + β3∆Scaleit + β4∆Concit + μi + ψit (12)
where ∆ denotes changes and μi is a fixed eﬀect. All variables except dummies and share variables
are expressed in logs.
As mentioned above, FDI is total cumulative FDI flows over the years preceding the Census
year. I use the simple sum of FDI from all source countries in a base specification. In order to
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test the hypothesis that distance to the source matters for the eﬀect of FDI, I also construct a
distance-weighted measure of total FDI:
FDIdwit =
X
c
½
(FDIitc · distc) /
P
c
distc
¾
(13)
where dist is distance between the source country and Mexico13 and c indexes countries. If firms
from more distant countries are more likely to source locally and thus provide greater spillovers,
the eﬀect of distance-weighted FDI on productivity and wages should be greater than that of the
simple sum of all FDI. On the other hand, the closest source country is also the most technologically
advanced, the U.S., which is also the NAFTA partner country. These facts may easily confound the
hypothesized eﬀect of distance. In order to check for the possibility that the eﬀect of U.S. FDI is
fundamentally diﬀerent from that of other sources, I split FDI into that originating in the U.S. and
that originating elsewhere. More generally, finding diﬀerential eﬀects would support the hypothesis
that the source country of FDI matters.
The data also distinguish FDI flowing into maquiladoras versus all other FDI. Thus, in another
specification, I enter maquiladora and non-maquila FDI separately since the two may have diﬀerent
eﬀects. In particular, since maquiladoras are mainly low-technology assembly plants and are thus
largely consistent with vertical FDI, one would expect no or less of an eﬀect. More generally, finding
diﬀerential eﬀects would support the hypothesis that the industry destination of FDI matters.
Checking the role of distance, source and destination of FDI is rarely done in the literature and
thus constitutes an important contribution of this study.
While I hypothesize that foreign presence aﬀects total factor productivity and thus a regression
of TFP on FDI and controls is an appropriate approach, the model outlined above suggests a
complementary, indirect approach. Instead of going through the procedure of estimating TFP, we
can directly estimate the eﬀect of foreign presence on labor productivity. This approach is also
useful for comparing the results of this study to earlier ones that use only labor productivity, not
TFP. Consider again the standard Cobb-Douglas production function (1). Dividing it by L and
taking natural logs yields
lpit = tfpit + β5klit + β6kit + ηit (14)
13Distance in kilometers is a complex measure taken from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations In-
ternationales (CEPII) which uses domestic and international distance weighted by the population concentration in
important cities within a country. However, the measure is highly correlated with simpler distance measures and re-
sults are not aﬀected by the choice of distance. Note that this measure provides the shortest distance for U.S.-Mexico,
whose distance is not obvious, but important for this study.
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where lp = ln (Y/L) is log value added per worker (labor productivity), kl = ln (K/L), k = ln (K),
β5 = (1− α2), β6 = (α1 + α2 − 1) and ηit is an error term. Substituting (9) into (14) yields
lpit = β0 + β1FDIit + β2QLit + β3Scaleit + β4Concit + β5klit + β6kit + χit (15)
where χit = ηit + ψit. That is, with labor productivity as the dependent variable we must add the
capital-labor ratio as well as capital by itself. Note that equations (10) - (12) change accordingly.
Similarly, we can derive an expression for wages paid. Assuming that workers earn their marginal
product, we obtain an expression for (log) wages per worker by taking the partial derivative of (1)
with respect to L, divide by L, take natural logs and substitute for TFP to obtain
wpwit = δ0 + δ1FDIit + δ2QLit + δ3Scaleit + δ4Concit + δ5klit + δ6kit + τ it (16)
where wpw is (the natural log of) wages per worker, δ5 = (2− α2), δ6 = (α1 + α2 − 2) and τ it
is again an iid error term. As discussed earlier, existing literature finds ambiguous eﬀects of the
presence of foreign firms in an industry on overall wages. Often, foreign firms pay higher wages, but
there is a negative spillover eﬀect on domestic firms, where the total eﬀect could then go either way.
This total eﬀect, however, is what matters both for policy makers as well as for workers on average.
Even if foreign firms pay higher wages, if they crowd out domestic firms suﬃciently, or simply
poach the best workers from them, the notion that FDI is beneficial is at least questionable. Since
data on skilled and unskilled worker compensation is available separately, I can also investigate the
eﬀect of FDI on these types of wages as well as on income inequality, measured as the share of
total compensation accruing to skilled workers. A detailed description of all data and sources is
provided in the Data Appendix.
Before turning to the results, I emphasize that the Census data used here provide a compre-
hensive account of the manufacturing sector, unlike the annual industrial survey, which is used, for
example, in López-Córdova (2003) and Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare (2004) and does not constitute
a representative sample. Moreover, since the focus is on long-term trends, 5-year intervals seem
appropriate. Finally, the fact that a Census was conducted just prior to the inception of NAFTA
and the coincident availability of detailed FDI data provides an ideal control for initial conditions.
A downside of the data is that it is industry- rather than plant-level data. For confidentiality rea-
sons, plant-level data from the Census is unavailable and thus this study must confine the analysis
to the industry-level, as other studies using Census data, e.g. Jordaan (2005), have.
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6 Results
6.1 A View From Trade
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, this subsection presents some suggestive evidence on
the nature of FDI in the wake of NAFTA, which has implications for its expected eﬀect on produc-
tivity, as discussed above. Recall that FDI can roughly be classified as horizontal (market seeking)
or vertical (exploiting comparative advantage).14 Robertson (2006), using U.S. and Mexican manu-
facturing employment data, documents that before NAFTA, Mexican and U.S. production workers
are within-sector substitutes, whereas following NAFTA, they tend to be complements. This finding
is indirect evidence that post-NAFTA FDI tends to be of the vertical kind.
I take a diﬀerent approach and instead compute an index of intra-industry trade (IIT) by sector
and correlate it with FDI. Exports and imports in an industry are both high when parts and
components are imported for final assembly and then reexported, reflecting vertical integration.
Thus, a positive correlation between an IIT index and FDI is consistent with vertical FDI. If,
however, FDI flows into industries with little intra-industry trade, it is more likely a substitute for
trade and thus of the horizontal kind. Simple correlations of course do not imply causation, but
they provide at least some indication of the nature of FDI in Mexico.
The correlations shown in Table 4 distinguish between maquila, non-maquila and total FDI.
The intra-industry trade index is a simple index also known as the Grubel-Lloyd (1971, 1975)
index. Trade data come from Robert Feenstra’s database at the Center for International Data at
UC Davis and are constructed from United Nations trade data.
The top third of the table shows FDI-IIT correlations using the raw Grubel-Lloyd index (lagged
by one year). When all available year-country-sector observations are used, there is a positive and
significant correlation between FDI and intra-industry trade. Importantly, it is larger for maquila
FDI, as expected. When, in columns 4-6, only U.S. data is used to construct the IIT index (but
still all countries’ FDI), the correlation becomes smaller and retains significance only for total and
maquila FDI, despite the greatly increased number of observations.
Since annual values may be too volatile, I next look at changes in IIT since these could be
indicative of the changing nature of a sector and thus more highly correlated with subsequent FDI.
However, the results in rows 4-6 indicate that this is not the case as even the correlations that
14This classification is of course a simplification as no investment is likely to be purely horizontal or vertical and
there are bound to be many cases of “complex” FDI (Yeaple 2003). Still, it is prevalent in the literature.
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are statistically significant are very small. The final three rows thus look at the value of IIT in
1993, just before the inception of NAFTA, and its correlation with subsequent cumulative FDI.
The correlation for maquiladora FDI is now larger, in particular when each country’s own data is
used to compute the IIT index, supporting the notion that this FDI is of the vertical kind. Overall,
these simple correlations point to some diﬀerences in FDI flowing into maquiladora versus non-
maquiladora industries and thus provide additional support for characterizing maquiladora FDI as
vertical in the subsequent regression analysis.
6.2 FDI Eﬀects
The results for the eﬀect of FDI on various outcomes are shown in Tables 6 through 11. In order
to have a comparable sample, all regressions are run using only those sectors for which there is
complete information for all FDI components. All regressions report heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors and include a 2003 dummy (not reported). Table 5 contains summary statistics for
all variables.
Tables 6a and 6b contain the results for total factor productivity for the three models (10) - (12)
described above. The first three columns of Table 6a use total FDI whereas the remaining three
columns use the distance-weighted FDI measure. The estimated eﬀect of FDI diﬀers significantly
between the two FDI measures for two of the three models. Unweighted FDI has no eﬀect on TFP
when 1993 TFP is included to correct for self-selection. It becomes significantly positive, however,
for both models that include industry fixed eﬀects. For TFP levels, the estimated elasticity suggests
that a 10 percent higher FDI corresponds to a half percent higher TFP. The elasticity for the change
in TFP is about three times as high. Conversely, distance-weighted FDI is never estimated to exert
a significantly positive eﬀect and thus all coeﬃcients are no larger than those on unweighted FDI.
No model thus supports the hypothesis of more distant FDI having a larger productivity eﬀect.
The control variables perform reasonably well considering the sample size and model design.
Labor quality is never significant, although it will be in later specifications and then always with
the expected positive sign. Scale economies appear to be important only when no fixed eﬀects
are included and concentration has an unexpected positive sign (recall it is proxied by the number
of plants, so a negative sign is expected). However, it is only marginally significant, and when
industry fixed eﬀects are included, none of the controls is significant. The initial level of TFP itself
is highly significant and positive, as expected. The insignificance of other controls in the fixed eﬀects
specifications is not particularly surprising given the short time dimension and thus relatively little
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variation. Thus, it is all the more striking that FDI is estimated to exert a significantly positive
eﬀect on productivity. Note also that in each case the R2 is relatively high. In the first model, much
of that is due to the initial condition, as TFP is quite persistent; and this is typical in fixed eﬀects
regressions. Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables consistently indicates that no variables
appear to be missing from the model, although it is well-known that the test has relatively low
power.
The basic result is in contrast with the findings of López-Córdova (2003), who found no eﬀect of
FDI (levels or changes) on productivity in the same industry except in one levels regression when
he did not control for plant ownership. He did find evidence of intra-industry spillovers, which
we cannot examine here. We can, however, examine the eﬀect of diﬀerent sources and diﬀerent
destination industries of FDI.
In Table 6b, I split (unweighted) FDI by destination and by source country. The first three
columns split FDI into maquiladora and non-maquiladora FDI. There is a stark contrast between the
model with initial conditions and those that include fixed eﬀects. The first model has a significantly
positive coeﬃcient on maquila FDI, although it is economically small. Conversely, the fixed eﬀect
models both have a significant coeﬃcient on non-maquiladora FDI, suggesting it has a positive
eﬀect on TFP levels and growth, supporting the hypothesis that horizontal rather than vertical
FDI promotes productivity. The magnitude is roughly comparable to that of total FDI. The
diﬀerential eﬀects lead one to suspect that controlling for baseline TFP may avoid the self-selection
bias, but not the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which requires the fixed eﬀects. Thus, we
have more confidence in the results of the latter models.
The last three columns split FDI into that which originates in the United States and that which
originates in other countries. The coeﬃcients on U.S. FDI all have the same signs and almost all
have the same significance levels as total FDI. An exception is model (11) which is just outside
of conventional significance levels. Conversely, the coeﬃcient on non-U.S. FDI is not statistically
significant. This illustrates how total FDI is dominated by U.S. FDI which appears to have a
positive eﬀect. It is interesting to note that this occurs even though most maquiladora FDI, which
is not found to have a positive eﬀect on TFP, originates in the U.S. However, a significant amount of
non-maquiladora FDI does as well. More generally, the results illustrate how examining only total
FDI obscures some of the underlying regularities, such as the importance of the source as well as
the destination of FDI in the host country. The size and significance levels of the control variables,
the R2 and the Ramsey’s RESET test are very similar to those in the previous regressions of the
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same models. Note that these results are robust to other definitions of the labor quality, proxied
by the share of skilled labor.
In summary, there is compelling evidence that FDI, in particular that from the U.S. going into
non-maquiladora plants, has a positive eﬀect on both TFP and TFP growth. This result is in
line with the hypotheses that a positive FDI eﬀect is more likely from investment originating in
technologically advanced countries and being of the horizontal rather than the vertical kind. There
is no evidence that FDI originating in more distant countries generates more spillovers to local
firms and thus has a more positive influence.
Tables 7a and 7b show results using labor productivity, defined as value added per worker, as the
dependent variable instead. Using this simpler measure of productivity, the regressions additionally
include the capital-labor ratio and capital stock as demonstrated in (15). In all regressions, the
coeﬃcients on these two variables are significant and of the expected sign. All other controls are
identical, except that baseline (1993) productivity is now also labor productivity.
The results for the eﬀect of FDI are weaker than with TFP. Total FDI exerts a significantly
positive eﬀect on labor productivity only in the first model, as does maquiladora FDI. The fixed
eﬀect models have positive coeﬃcients on U.S., as in the TFP regressions, though the magnitude
is cut in half. Thus, one can conclude that there is less evidence of a positive eﬀect of FDI on
labor productivity and that it is smaller than its eﬀect on TFP. Another stark diﬀerence to the
TFP results is that when fixed eﬀects are included, all industry level variables except labor quality
are strongly statistically significant. All but concentration have the expected signs. It may be that
while the proxy, the number of plants in an industry, does indeed matter, it is a poor proxy for
market concentration, even after controlling for scale. Unfortunately, no better control is available
for all years at this time. Finally note that the R2 are very high (0.94 and up), while some of the
Ramsey tests appear to indicate the possibility of omitted variables. This case illustrates the low
power of the test.
While the diﬀering results with respect to the two productivities certainly warrant further
research, they do underscore that measured productivity eﬀects from globalization crucially depend
on which productivity measure is used. Table 5 shows that, on average, measured TFP as well as
labor productivity fell over the sample period, the latter by more. Labor productivity, while easily
calculated and often available for many sectors, years and countries, is perhaps a relatively poor
measure and we ought to have more confidence in the relevance of the sophisticated TFP measure
used here. The results also demonstrate that aggregate analyses such as Ramirez (2006), who
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finds a positive eﬀect of FDI per worker on labor productivity growth in Mexico, mask underlying
industry trends.
Next, I turn to examining the impact of FDI on average remuneration, results of which are in
Tables 8a and 8b. Remuneration is defined as total payments to labor, inclusive of benefits. This
is then divided by the total labor force. The controls are the same as those for labor productivity,
as shown in (16). Using total FDI, only the first model shows a significantly positive eﬀect of
FDI. The results in Table 8a are identical to those in Table 7a where the dependent variable is
labor productivity, seemingly confirming that over the sample period, wages reflect productivity.
However, splitting the sample (see Table 8b), the coeﬃcient on maquiladora FDI is significantly
negative in the fixed eﬀect models as is that on US. FDI. This result is important since it provides
evidence that FDI can have diﬀerential eﬀects depending on its source as well as its destination.
Maquiladora operations tend to be more unskilled-labor intensive than non-maquiladora ones, im-
plying that FDI into them raises the relative demand for unskilled labor. Indeed, when skilled and
unskilled wages are investigated separately in Tables 9 and 10, respectively, maquiladora FDI is
shown to have a negative eﬀect on skilled wages only. We should note, however, that the magnitude
is quite small. For example, in regression (8), Table 8b, a ten percent increase in FDI is associated
with a 0.19 percent decrease in average remuneration.
Most control variables that are significant are sensible. For example, scale is often significantly
positive, confirming that larger plants tend to pay higher wages. In the changes regressions, the
change in the share of skilled workers is large and positive, as one would expect since a shift towards
a more skill-intensive labor mix should raise average compensation. One problem in looking at wage
eﬀects over this period of time is the large drop in real wages as a result of the peso crisis. As
can be seen in Table 5, this drop is large enough to result in a negative average wage change in
the sample, even though the 1998-2003 change is positive. It can also be seen that the drop is
comparable for skilled and unskilled workers.
As mentioned above, I examine the eﬀect of FDI on average compensation for skilled and
unskilled workers separately. In order to conserve space, Tables 9 (for skilled workers) and 10
(for unskilled workers) contain only the coeﬃcients on the FDI variables and omit those on the
controls, which are identical to those used in the average total compensation regressions. The
results for skilled wages are very similar to the results for overall wages, whereas only U.S. FDI
in regression (11) is marginally significant, and negative, for unskilled wages. Thus, there is no
evidence of positive average wage eﬀects of FDI, despite some evidence of positive productivity
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eﬀects. This overall eﬀect is in line with earlier findings, e.g. Aitken et al. (1996) for both Mexico
and Venezuela. As in their study, the lack of an overall eﬀect could be masking very diﬀerent eﬀects
on foreign-owned versus domestically owned firms, which cannot be ascertained in this study.
Finally, Table 11 checks whether there is an eﬀect of FDI on wage inequality. I now use the
share of total compensation accruing to skilled workers as the dependent variable. Again, all
control variables are the same as in the other wage regressions and their coeﬃcients are sensible,
but omitted in order to conserve space. Note that a positive coeﬃcient on FDI is consistent with
FDI contributing to wage inequality. Significantly positive coeﬃcients appear when we include
the initial 1993 skilled remuneration share for total and non-maquiladora FDI and marginally for
non-U.S. FDI. Conversely, the fixed eﬀect models show a negative coeﬃcient on maquiladora FDI.
Again, this is consistent with theoretical expectations. As maquiladora FDI tends to raise the
relative demand for unskilled labor and non-maquiladora FDI the relative demand for skilled labor,
the two should have opposing eﬀects on wage inequality. However, since maquiladora FDI was
shown to reduce overall wages by reducing skilled workers’ wages, this result is not a positive one.
More generally, we emphasize that, of course, rising inequality is not inconsistent with absolute
improvements in both skilled and unskilled wages. As discussed above, this is true for the time
period between the 1999 and 2004 Census years, but not the time between the 1994 and 1999
Census years due to the peso crisis.
To sum up, the results of this study indicate that FDI appears to have a positive eﬀect on
industry productivity, at least when measured as total factor productivity, but that notwithstand-
ing, workers’ wages are either not or negatively aﬀected, largely in association with increased
maquiladora investment. Thus, it appears that productivity and wages have been diverging over
the NAFTA period. The origin of FDI also often plays a role, with U.S. FDI largely driving produc-
tivity as well as wage eﬀects. The results provide some support for the hypothesis that horizontal
FDI is a more likely source of beneficial productivity eﬀects. The hypothesis that more distant
FDI is more likely to source locally and thus have a more positive eﬀect cannot be confirmed. The
likely reason is the dominance of U.S. FDI in the Mexican case.
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7 Conclusion
There is great interest in the eﬀects of NAFTA on various economic indicators in Mexico, such as
productivity or wages. Naturally, it is diﬃcult to disentangle NAFTA from other factors aﬀecting
the Mexican economy since its inception. Thus, the goal of this study is more modest in docu-
menting the eﬀect of increased foreign direct investment inflows into Mexico, which the literature
has well established, on productivity and wages over the years since NAFTA was enacted without
ascribing these to the agreement per se. An important feature of the study is that I pay attention to
the source country and the destination industry of FDI. They are shown to matter, consistent with
theoretical hypotheses, although I cannot confirm that FDI from more distant countries has a larger
positive eﬀect on TFP or labor productivity. This may be due to the dominant role of the United
States as a source country of investment as well as considerable export-platform investment by
other countries, suggesting that they all take advantage of the evolved vertically integrated North
American production network. However, positive productivity eﬀects stem from non-maquiladora
FDI, which is more likely to be of the horizontal kind. Wages, on the other hand, are at best
unaﬀected, but may be negatively aﬀected by FDI, particularly into maquiladoras. Since such
investments largely tend to reduce skilled wages, however, they help dampen income inequality.
Other contributions of this study are that I cover a longer time period, a full decade since
the inception of NAFTA, and use data from the Industrial Census, which contains comprehensive
information on economic activity in Mexico, unlike the annual surveys, which oversample large
firms. Ideally, I would like to have used plant level data from these Censuses, but due to extremely
strict confidentiality requirements imposed by Mexico’s statistical agency, this is not possible.
Still, to the extent that policy makers care about industry and aggregate eﬀects of foreign
investment, the study makes an important contribution to the discussion of the eﬃcacy of foreign
direct investment. Policies that increase a country’s openness to FDI and seek to attract more are
bolstered by the results in the sense that there is evidence that a greater foreign presence enhances
eﬃciency. However, a positive eﬀect on wages cannot be ascertained. While this result is not
encouraging, it is possible that the recent disconnect between productivity and wages may have
little to do with FDI. It could be a result of the specific time period studied, which was characterized
by a severe economic crisis from which wages in particular appear not to have recovered. That is,
while wages may well reflect productivity in the long run, it may be several more years before this
happens. Secondly, other factors, such as a diminished power of unions which has been observed
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in Mexico and elsewhere over the last two decades, could be driving a wedge between productivity
and wage changes and I have not accounted for those in the empirical analysis.
Future work in this area, and in particular on Mexico, should attempt to explore the specific
channels through which FDI aﬀects industry productivity. For example, data on R&D and tech-
nology expenditures could shed light on the question of technological versus other spillovers. Also,
observers of the Mexican economy note the regional disparities in economic development and for-
eign investment, which in part are tied to the location of maquiladoras. More detailed regional
data would help shed light on whether FDI benefits are indeed geographically limited and to what
extent. Clearly, these are important issues to be analyzed, but are beyond the scope of the present
study.
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Table 1: FDI Flows into Mexico 1994-2005, by Sector, in Millions of U.S. $
Year Total Manu- of which Services of which Agri- Mining
facturing Maquil. Trade culture
1994 10,630 6,195 893 4,327 1,247 10.0 97.8
1995 8,337 4,851 1,363 3,398 1,012 9.48 79.0
1996 7,823 4,814 1,415 2,891 739 33.4 83.8
1997 12,079 7,298 1,676 4,640 1,868 10.0 131
1998 8,325 5,003 2,105 3,244 1,038 29.1 49.4
1999 13,565 9,137 2,770 4,207 1,409 82.5 138
2000 17,507 9,879 2,980 7,338 2,432 91.6 199
2001 27,059 5,492 2,172 21,478 2,224 61.2 28.5
2002 18,150 7,582 2,043 10,234 1,739 92.6 242
2003 13,773 6,204 1,961 7,484 1,394 10.6 74.6
2004 18,361 9,290 2,474 9,185 1,175 14.8 141.9
2005 13,745 7,792 2,821 5,955 2,539 5.2 -7.71
1994-2005 169,626 83,536 24,672 84,382 18,815 450.5 1,257
Source (for Tables 1-4): Secretaría de Economía, Mexico, and author’s calculations.
Table 2: FDI Source Countries 1994-2005, Share as Percent of Total
Year United United European Japan OECD Developing
States Kingdom Union Countries
1994 46.9 5.6 18.1 5.9 78.7 21.2
1995 65.9 2.7 22.1 1.9 94.4 4.3
1996 67.5 1.1 14.7 1.8 92.1 6.8
1997 61.5 15.2 26.3 2.9 94.5 5.5
1998 65.6 2.2 24.7 1.2 95.6 4.4
1999 54.3 -1.4 28.5 9.1 97.7 2.3
2000 71.5 1.6 18.2 2.4 97.1 2.9
2001 77.8 0.5 15.5 0.7 97.3 2.7
2002 65.8 6.9 26.9 0.3 97.2 2.8
2003 59.2 7.7 33.3 0.9 98.0 2.0
2004 41.6 0.7 46.2 2.0 98.6 1.4
2005 65.7 2.2 29.0 0.5 98.1 1.9
1994-2005 62.8 3.5 25.6 2.3 95.8 4.1
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Table 3: FDI in Selected Manufacturing and Service Sub-Sectors
Sector Share∗ Share∗∗ Share∗∗ Share∗∗ Share∗∗ Share∗∗
(CMAP code in parentheses) Overall U.S. Canada UK Spain Japan
Food and Tobacco (31) 18.5 48.8 4.0 13.6 0.7 0.1
Textiles, Apparel,
Footwear and Leather (32) 3.7 79.4 0.8 3.1 2.1 0.1
Wood Products (33) 0.4 90.9 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Paper, Printing and
Publishing (34) 2.4 48.3 13.9 1.7 4.3 0.0
Chemicals and
Pharmaceuticals (35) 14.5 64.1 2.7 -0.7 8.4 0.5
Clay, Glass, Cement, etc. (36) 1.9 22.2 13.6 2.9 8.3 0.1
Nonferrous Metals,
Iron and Steel (37) 3.6 15.4 0.6 1.4 2.5 -0.1
Metals, Electrical Machinery,
Automobiles (38) 48.5 67.5 3.1 0.6 1.7 8.7
Electricity and Water (4) 2.1 4.2 0.0 0.1 82.0 0.9
Construction (5) 2.0 51.7 0.8 4.3 23.1 0.5
Wholesale Trade (61) 12.8 66.5 1.9 0.9 5.1 1.8
Retail Trade (62) 9.5 82.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2
Transportation (71) 1.3 57.2 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0
Communications (72) 9.0 67.0 0.6 8.5 37.4 -0.1
Banking and Insurance (81) 42.4 66.2 2.0 5.7 18.0 0.0
Hotels, Bars and
Restaurants (93) 5.8 69.6 4.5 0.8 10.9 0.5
Business and Personal
Services (95) 7.6 44.1 7.7 3.4 7.5 -0.4
Notes: CMAP is the Mexican Industrial Classification System. ∗‘Share Overall’ is share
of total manufacturing FDI for the manufacturing subsectors and share of total services FDI for
services subsectors. ∗∗ ‘Share’ by country is this country’s share of FDI in that subsector.
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Table 4: FDI-Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) Index Correlations
All Observations Using U.S. IIT
Corr. p-value Obs. Corr. p-value Obs.
Total FDI-
IIT, lagged 0.08 0.00 16,954 0.01 0.03 28,890
Maquila FDI -
IIT, lagged 0.11 0.00 16,954 0.03 0.00 28,890
Non-Maquila FDI -
IIT, lagged 0.05 0.00 16,954 0.00 0.91 28,890
Total FDI-
∆IIT, lagged 0.01 0.09 14,629 0.02 0.01 28,890
Maquila FDI -
∆IIT, lagged 0.00 0.93 14,629 0.00 0.77 28,890
Non-Maquila FDI -
∆IIT, lagged 0.02 0.05 14,629 0.02 0.00 28,890
Total FDI-
IIT 1993 0.11 0.00 2,250 0.01 0.50 4,680
Maquila FDI -
IIT 1993 0.12 0.00 2,250 0.04 0.01 4,680
Non-Maquila FDI -
IIT 1993 0.07 0.00 2,250 -0.01 0.40 4,680
Notes: Simple pair-wise correlations (Corr.). Obs.: Number of observations.
The top two thirds of the table use all available annual observations.
The bottom third of the table uses total post-1994 FDI.
The results on the right side of the table use IIT computed from U.S. data.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
TFP 1.529 1.582 0.446 0.474 2.804
∆ TFP -0.204 -0.201 0.354 -1.085 0.542
Labor Productivity 2.711 2.724 0.758 0.877 4.657
∆ Labor Productivity -0.624 -0.802 0.601 -1.863 0.385
Wages Per Worker 1.669 1.762 0.602 -0.095 3.099
∆ Wages Per Worker -0.725 -0.863 0.688 -1.867 0.436
Wages Per Skilled Worker 2.259 2.313 0.403 0.751 3.091
∆ Wages Per Skilled Worker -0.590 -0.687 0.763 -1.897 0.823
Wages Per Unskilled Worker 1.272 1.245 0.312 0.626 2.056
∆ Wages Per Unskilled Worker -0.608 -0.678 0.779 -1.604 0.429
Unweighted FDI 19.02 19.14 2.295 6.049 22.74
Distance Weighted FDI 13.49 13.41 0.504 12.67 14.87
Maquila FDI 15.15 16.60 5.883 0 21.56
Non-maquila FDI 18.63 18.97 2.374 6.049 22.60
U.S. FDI 18.43 18.88 2.406 6.049 22.07
Non-U.S. FDI 17.35 17.84 3.347 0 22.03
Share Skilled Workers 0.414 0.406 0.137 0.036 0.810
∆ Share Skilled Workers -0.029 -0.028 0.073 -0.298 0.112
Average Plant Size 6.974 7.146 1.946 2.754 11.18
∆ Average Plant Size -0.664 -0.756 0.709 -2.330 0.877
Number of Plants 7.752 7.794 1.573 3.178 11.06
∆ Number of Plants 0.131 0.166 0.455 -1.120 1.209
Capital-Labor Ratio 2.905 2.856 1.008 1.064 5.685
∆ Capital-Labor Ratio -0.630 -0.615 0.607 -2.065 0.780
Capital 13.86 13.82 1.119 11.05 16.46
∆ Capital -0.543 -0.552 0.544 -1.964 0.966
1993 TFP 1.903 1.972 0.441 1.121 2.974
1993 Labor Productivity 3.896 3.850 0.710 2.400 5.324
1993 Remuneration Per Worker 3.073 3.107 0.641 1.313 4.250
1993 Remuneration Per Skilled Worker 3.499 3.516 0.423 2.068 4.349
1993 Remuneration Per Unskilled Worker 2.560 2.498 0.361 1.976 3.407
Note: All non-share variables in logs (or log changes)
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Table 6a: FDI and Total Factor Productivity: Total and Distance Weighted FDI
Dependent Variable TFP TFP ∆ TFP TFP TFP ∆ TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unweighted FDI 0.004 0.050** 0.158***
(0.010) (0.025) (0.049)
Distance Weighted FDI -0.013 0.032 0.115
(0.055) (0.083) (0.173)
(∆) Labor Quality 0.291 -0.474 -0.847 0.276 -0.020 0.471
(0.280) (0.599) (0.796) (0.284) (0.617) (0.643)
(∆) Scale 0.087*** 0.254 0.067 0.092*** 0.252 0.048
(0.032) (0.169) (0.202) (0.031) (0.174) (0.205)
(∆) Concentration 0.074* 0.126 -0.201 0.076* 0.119 -0.202
(0.044) (0.163) (0.258) (0.044) (0.168) (0.275)
1993 TFP 0.662*** 0.667***
(0.076) (0.075)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.67 0.93 0.64 0.67 0.92 0.60
RESET F(·) 1.61 1.27 0.23 1.58 1.91 0.45
Prob. > F 0.19 0.30 0.87 0.20 0.15 0.72
Note: All regressions include a 2003 dummy (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All independent variables except FDI are in changes in columns (3) and (6).
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 6b: FDI and Total Factor Productivity: Maquila, Non-Maquila, U.S., Non-U.S. FDI
Dependent Variable TFP TFP ∆ TFP TFP TFP ∆ TFP
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Maquila FDI 0.010** -0.001 -0.005
(0.004) (0.009) (0.014)
Non-maquila FDI -0.008 0.062** 0.177***
(0.013) (0.029) (0.046)
U.S. FDI 0.005 0.043 0.122***
(0.015) (0.026) (0.036)
Non-U.S. FDI 0.001 0.011 0.034
(0.011) (0.036) (0.070)
(∆) Labor Quality 0.509* -0.153 -0.235 0.312 -0.415 -0.625
(0.302) (0.683) (0.755) (0.288) (0.619) (0.716)
(∆) Scale 0.089*** 0.241 0.068 0.084*** 0.247 0.057
(0.033) (0.173) (0.202) (0.032) (0.172) (0.203)
(∆) Concentration 0.077* 0.137 -0.175 0.073* 0.117 -0.205
(0.044) (0.161) (0.260) (0.044) (0.161) (0.265)
1993 TFP 0.649*** 0.658***
(0.073) (0.077)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.68 0.93 0.65 0.67 0.93 0.64
RESET F(·) 1.62 1.38 0.30 1.65 0.66 0.29
Prob. > F 0.19 0.27 0.82 0.18 0.58 0.83
Note: All regressions include a 2003 dummy (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
All independent variables except FDI are in changes in columns (9) and (12).
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 7a: FDI and Labor Productivity: Total and Distance Weighted FDI
Dependent Variable Prod. Prod. ∆ Prod. Prod. Prod. ∆ Prod.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unweighted FDI 0.025** 0.002 0.025
(0.010) (0.024) (0.052)
Distance Weighted FDI 0.017 -0.054 -0.069
(0.048) (0.052) (0.089)
(∆) Labor Quality 0.660* -0.137 0.187 0.607 -0.180 0.381
(0.396) (0.410) (0.667) (0.391) (0.371) (0.469)
(∆) Scale 0.470*** 1.067*** 1.040*** 0.464*** 1.093*** 1.074***
(0.085) (0.162) (0.211) (0.086) (0.161) (0.224)
(∆) Concentration 0.444*** 1.100*** 1.084*** 0.419*** 1.118*** 1.122***
(0.099) (0.173) (0.219) (0.098) (0.166) (0.225)
(∆) Capital-Labor Ratio 0.453*** 0.984*** 1.036*** 0.407*** 0.981*** 1.037***
(0.087) (0.169) (0.288) (0.082) (0.165) (0.195)
(∆) Capital -0.363*** -1.090*** -1.185*** -0.320*** -1.108*** -1.220***
(0.103) (0.182) (0.205) (0.100) (0.178) (0.216)
1993 Labor Productivity 0.246*** 0.285***
(0.079) (0.077)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.94 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.96
RESET F(·) 3.08 2.12 2.78 3.74 2.30 2.77
Prob. > F 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.06
Note: All regressions include a 2003 dummy (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
All independent variables except FDI are in changes in columns (3) and (6).
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 7b: FDI and Labor Productivity: Maquila, Non-Maquila, U.S., Non-U.S. FDI
Dependent Variable Prod. Prod. ∆ Prod. Prod. Prod. ∆ Prod.
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Maquila FDI 0.009** -0.0003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
Non-maquila FDI 0.016 0.001 0.024
(0.012) (0.026) (0.052)
U.S. FDI 0.021 0.027** 0.058*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.030)
Non-U.S. FDI 0.004 -0.036 -0.053
(0.010) (0.022) (0.037)
(∆) Labor Quality 0.710* -0.116 0.302 0.684* -0.318 0.045
(0.369) (0.440) (0.599) (0.398) (0.405) (0.586)
(∆) Scale 0.488*** 1.068*** 1.033*** 0.474*** 1.076*** 1.044***
(0.081) (0.172) (0.218) (0.085) (0.164) (0.220)
(∆) Concentration 0.470*** 1.100*** 1.079*** 0.451*** 1.086*** 1.077***
(0.092) (0.180) (0.229) (0.099) (0.169) (0.219)
(∆) Capital-Labor Ratio 0.481*** 0.985*** 1.028*** 0.458*** 0.929*** 1.004***
(0.082) (0.173) (0.197) (0.088) (0.172) (0.197)
(∆) Capital -0.392*** -1.091** -1.175*** -0.368*** -1.087*** -1.196***
(0.095) (0.189) (0.218) (0.104) (0.109) (0.210)
1993 Labor Productivity 0.249*** 0.247***
(0.080) (0.081)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.94 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.97
RESET F(·) 2.35 2.02 3.02 3.53 4.07 2.83
Prob. > F 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05
Note: All regressions include a 2003 dummy (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
All independent variables except FDI are in changes in columns (9) and (12).
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 8a: FDI and Wages: Total and Distance Weighted FDI
Dependent Variable Wages Wages ∆ Wages Wages Wages ∆ Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unweighted FDI 0.028*** -0.027 -0.059
(0.014) (0.025) (0.036)
Distance Weighted FDI -0.015 0.052 0.064
(0.044) (0.085) (0.121)
(∆) Labor Quality 0.726* 0.365 1.541** 0.605 0.209 1.051
(0.380) (0.512) (0.588) (0.411) (0.738) (0.681)
(∆) Scale 0.121 0.478*** 0.283 0.117 0.423*** 0.229
(0.089) (0.138) (0.175) (0.087) (0.138) (0.171)
(∆) Concentration 0.061 0.419*** 0.249 0.054 0.369 0.183
(0.104) (0.155) (0.195) (0.103) (0.155) (0.187)
(∆) Capital-Labor Ratio 0.003 0.451** 0.360** -0.038 0.433** 0.362**
(0.077) (0.191) (0.142) (0.075) (0.169) (0.134)
(∆) Capital 0.004 -0.350* -0.257 0.037 -0.293 -0.200
(0.109) (0.201) (0.158) (0.106) (0.183) (0.144)
1993 Remuneration 0.534*** 0.629***
(0.085) (0.083)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.98 0.97
RESET F(·) 5.98 1.59 2.91 5.69 3.43 5.13
Prob. > F 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.01
Note: All regressions include a 2003 dummy (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
All independent variables except FDI are in changes in columns (3) and (6).
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 8b: FDI and Wages: Maquila, Non-Maquila, U.S., Non-U.S. FDI
Dependent Variable Wages Wages ∆ Wages Wages Wages ∆ Wages
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Maquila FDI 0.005 -0.019* -0.026*
(0.005) (0.011) (0.014)
Non-maquila FDI 0.024 0.004 -0.020
(0.015) (0.027) (0.038)
U.S. FDI 0.016 -0.056** -0.078**
(0.015) (0.021) (0.033)
Non-U.S. FDI 0.008 0.024 0.016
(0.012) (0.027) (0.035)
(∆) Labor Quality 0.792** 0.566 1.538** 0.739* 0.579 1.660***
(0.382) (0.524) (0.600) (0.374) (0.405) (0.560)
(∆) Scale 0.134* 0.432*** 0.261 0.127 0.498*** 0.296*
(0.084) (0.147) (0.173) (0.088) (0.143) (0.170)
(∆) Concentration 0.073 0.368** 0.199 0.067 0.464*** 0.270
(0.099) (0.164) (0.195) (0.105) (0.154) (0.191)
(∆) Capital-Labor Ratio 0.018 0.418** 0.323** 0.005 0.517*** 0.375**
(0.067) (0.185) (0.142) (0.080) (0.184) (0.139)
(∆) Capital -0.011 -0.298 -0.201 0.003 -0.384* -0.262
(0.100) (0.196) (0.162) (0.111) (0.201) (0.160)
1993 Remuneration 0.513*** 0.532***
(0.084) (0.087)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.99 0.98
RESET F(·) 6.04 1.78 3.08 5.80 2.36 3.45
Prob. > F 0.00 0.17 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.03
Note: All regressions include a 2003 dummy (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
All independent variables except FDI are in changes in columns (9) and (12).
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 9: FDI and Skilled Wages
Dependent Variable Wages Wages ∆ Wages Wages Wages ∆ Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unweighted FDI 0.011 -0.016 0.019
(0.019) (0.025) (0.045)
Distance Weighted FDI 0.072* 0.057 0.119
(0.042) (0.069) (0.106)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.82 0.97 0.97 0.77 0.97 0.97
RESET F(·) 1.30 4.44 1.18 3.22 5.77 0.15
Prob. > F 0.28 0.01 0.33 0.03 0.00 0.93
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Maquila FDI 0.001 -0.023** -0.031***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.011)
Non-maquila FDI 0.0011 0.013 0.048
(0.018) (0.023) (0.042)
U.S. FDI -0.005 -0.040** -0.031
(0.016) (0.019) (0.032)
Non-U.S. FDI 0.013 0.025 0.044
(0.010) (0.026) (0.041)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.82 0.97 0.98 0.82 0.97 0.97
RESET F(·) 1.32 3.57 0.14 1.68 5.87 0.12
Prob. > F 0.27 0.03 0.93 0.18 0.00 0.95
Note: Skilled wages are measured as the log of total remuneration per non-production worker.
All regressions include the same regressors as the regressions in Tables 8a and 8b as well as
a 2003 dummy (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 10: FDI and Unskilled Wages
Dependent Variable Wages Wages ∆ Wages Wages Wages ∆ Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unweighted FDI 0.010 0.002 0.015
(0.007) (0.022) (0.038)
Distance Weighted FDI 0.023 0.065 0.134
(0.034) (0.089) (0.122)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.82 0.94 0.98 0.80 0.94 0.98
RESET F(·) 1.29 1.96 4.20 1.88 1.39 5.38
Prob. > F 0.29 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.26 0.00
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Maquila FDI 0.002 0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.011) (0.014)
Non-maquila FDI 0.009 0.010 0.027
(0.008) (0.025) (0.034)
U.S. FDI -0.002 -0.041* -0.056
(0.010) (0.024) (0.037)
Non-U.S. FDI 0.007 0.023 0.046
(0.007) (0.029) (0.037)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.82 0.94 0.98 0.82 0.95 0.98
RESET F(·) 1.36 2.14 4.22 1.42 1.11 4.89
Prob. > F 0.26 0.12 0.01 0.24 0.36 0.01
Note: Unskilled wages are measured as the log of total remuneration per production worker.
All regressions include the same regressors as the regressions in Tables 8a and 8b as well as
a 2003 dummy (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Table 11: FDI and Inequality
Dependent Variable Share Share ∆ Share Share Share ∆ Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unweighted FDI 0.007*** -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
Distance Weighted FDI 0.004 -0.006 -0.013
(0.008) (0.012) (0.022)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.94 0.99 0.87 0.94 0.99 0.87
RESET F(·) 4.71 2.48 1.54 6.83 2.19 1.50
Prob. > F 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.00 0.11 0.23
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Maquila FDI 0.001 -0.004** -0.007**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Non-maquila FDI 0.005** -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010)
U.S. FDI 0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Non-U.S. FDI 0.003* -0.001 -0.004
(0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
Fixed Eﬀects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.94 0.99 0.88 0.94 0.99 0.87
RESET F(·) 5.48 3.60 2.67 5.50 2.52 1.38
Prob. > F 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.27
Note: Inequality is measured as the share of remuneration for non-production workers in total
remuneration.
All regressions include the same regressors as the regressions in Tables 8a and 8b as well as
a 2003 dummy (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses
RESET is Ramsey’s RESET test for omitted variables, H0: no omitted variables.
*, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.
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Figure 1: FDI Flows 1994-2005, by Major Sector, Millions of U.S. Dollars
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Data Appendix
Sources:
All FDI data is from Secretaría de Economía, Mexico. The distance data used to compute distance-
weighted FDI is from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).
Value added, capital, labor (skilled and unskilled), remuneration (skilled and unskilled), industry
output and number of firms are from the 1994, 1999, and 2004 Industrial Census, conducted by
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI). 2-digit industry level Producer
Price Index data is also from INEGI; the U.S. Producer Price Index is from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Exchange rate data is from International Financial Statistics (IFS). Export and import
data are from the Center for International Data at the University of California-Davis.
Variables:
Unless noted otherwise, variables are in natural logarithms.
Total Factor Productivity : computed as described in the text using value added, net fixed assets,
total workforce and material inputs. Nominal values in Mexican pesos were deflated using a 2-digit
level producer price index and converted to U.S. dollars using the annual average market exchange
rate. Industry classification is at the 4-digit level according to the Mexican Industrial Classification
system (known by its Spanish acronym CMAP).
Labor Productivity : real value added, converted to ‘000s of U.S. dollars, divided by total workforce.
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Wages: total annual real remuneration per worker. Skilled wages are those for empleados (non-
production workers), unskilled wages are those for obreros (production workers). Inequality is the
share of remuneration of non-production workers in total remuneration.
FDI : since all published FDI data is reported in U.S. dollars, the U.S. producer price index is used
to convert them to real values, in ‘000s of dollars.
Distance Weighted FDI : computed using the formula (13) given in the text. Distance is in kilome-
ters, computed by CEPII using domestic and international distances weighted by the population
concentration in important cities within a country.
Quality of Labor : proxied by the share of remuneration for non-production workers in total remu-
neration, as described above.
Scale: proxied by the average plant size in an industry, which is total industry real output, deflated
using the 2-digit industry-level producer price index and converted to ‘000s of U.S. dollars, divided
by the number of plants in the industry.
Concentration: proxied by the number of plants in an industry.
Capital(-Labor Ratio): Capital is real net fixed assets. The capital-labor ratio is capital divided by
the total workforce.
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